夜雨聆风The Economist May 16th 2026
《经济学人》2026 年5 月 16 日封面文章
How to prepare for a jobs apocalypse
如何应对就业危机
Governments must start to lay a safety-net for workers threatened by AI
各国政府必须着手为受人工智能威胁的劳动者搭建安全保障网
THE LAUNCH of ChatGPT in 2022 ignited the artificial-intelligence boom-and elicited a chorus of warnings from AI bosses of an impending jobs apocalypse. Never mind that they have reason to talk up the disruptiveness of their products, or that rich-world employment is near all-time highs--the dark messagehas landed. Seven in ten Americans think AI will make it harder for people to find work; nearly a third fear for their own jobs. A dearth of openings for college graduates-especially computer programmers-amplifies the dread.
2022 年 ChatGPT 的推出引爆了人工智能热潮，同时一众人工智能行业高管纷纷发出警告，称一场就业危机即将来临。即便这些企业高管有理由夸大自家产品的颠覆性，且发达国家就业率已接近历史高位，但这一悲观论调已然深入人心。七成美国人认为人工智能会让人们求职变得更难，近三分之一的人担心自己丢掉工作。大学毕业生（尤其是计算机程序员）就业岗位稀缺，进一步加剧了这种恐慌情绪。
The past offers some solace for the anxious. Labour markets constantly change. Today’s offices would be unrecognisable to a worker from 50 years ago. Never in modern history has technological progress hurt the overall demand for human labour (see Finance & economics section). Economic historians now play down the magnitude of “Engels’ pause”, the period during the Industrial Revolution in which working-class wages grew more slowly than the wider economy.
历史能给焦虑的人们带来些许慰藉。劳动力市场始终处在不断变化之中。倘若让 50 年前的劳动者走进如今的办公室，他们会完全认不出。近现代历史上，技术进步从未削弱对人类劳动力的整体需求（详见财经板块）。经济史学家如今也不再过度放大 “恩格斯停滞期” 的影响，该时期指工业革命中工人阶级薪资增速远低于整体经济增速的阶段。
Yet history is not always a good guide to the future, as the Industrial Revolution itself showed. The top AI models are awesome. They can tackle much more complex coding tasks than people were predicting a year ago. The number of AI agents has exploded. Spending on AI by businesses is up dramatically. Annualised recurring revenue of Anthropic, a hot model-maker, is set to reach $50bn by the end of June. There is no evidence yet in the labourmarket data of AI destroying many jobs. But given how fast it is improving, it would be rash to dismiss fears that it will. Society may be on the verge of a profound reallocation of resources, and political upheaval.
然而，正如工业革命本身所昭示的那样，历史并非总能精准指引未来。顶尖人工智能模型的能力已然超乎想象，如今能处理的编程任务复杂度，远超一年前人们的预判。智能代理数量呈爆炸式增长，企业在人工智能领域的投入大幅攀升。热门人工智能模型开发商安索普公司的年度经常性收入，预计将在 6 月底达到 500 亿美元。目前劳动力市场数据中，尚无证据表明人工智能已大规模摧毁就业岗位。但鉴于人工智能迭代升级的速度之快，贸然忽视就业危机的担忧未免太过轻率。社会或将迎来资源的深度重新配置，甚至引发政治动荡。
Economists’ prediction that work will stay plentiful is less reassuring than it looks, especially over a long horizon. Though the market will find uses for human labour even as models and robots become more capable, the quality of those jobs and the wages they pay are not guaranteed. Data centres will account for 8.5% of America’s peak power demand in 2027, up from 4.1% in 2025, predicts Goldman Sachs, a bank. As AI firms bid up the price of land and energy, the dollars people earn will go less far. Eventually humans could, like horses in the age of the car, become uneconomical. Income may go mostly or entirely to owners of capital, who then go on to spend it on things made by AI and robots using natural resources that they monopolise.
经济学家关于就业岗位仍将保持充足的预测，实则并没有看上去那么令人安心，从长远来看尤其如此。即便人工智能模型和机器人能力愈发强大，市场仍会为人类劳动力找到用武之地，但这些岗位的工作质量和薪资水平却无法得到保障。高盛银行预测，2027 年数据中心将占用美国用电峰值的 8.5%，较2025 年的 4.1% 大幅攀升。随着人工智能企业哄抬土地和能源价格，人们的收入购买力将持续缩水。最终，人类或许会像汽车时代的马匹一样，失去经济使用价值。社会财富可能大部分甚至全部流向资本所有者，而这些资本持有者又会将财富消费在由人工智能、机器人依托其垄断的自然资源所生产的产品上。
This dystopian possibility is behind Silicon Valley’s admonitions that state intervention, and perhaps a universal basic income, will be necessary. That remains a long way off, if it ever happens. But governments may have to act sooner, for you do not need a cataclysm to stoke popular fury. Perhaps 2m Americans lost their jobs between 1999 and 2011 owing to China’s entry into the global trading system. That is no worse than a typical month’s lay-offs in America’s churning labour market. Yet the “China shock” helped propel Donald Trump to office and led to the highest tariffs since the 1930s.
正是这种反乌托邦的潜在前景，让硅谷各界呼吁必须进行政府干预，甚至推行全民基本收入制度。即便该制度未来能够落地，短期内也难以实现。但各国政府或许必须尽早采取行动，因为无需重大灾难，也足以激起民众的愤怒。1999 年至2011 年间，约 200 万美国人因中国融入全球贸易体系而失业，这一数字仅相当于美国波动的劳动力市场单月常规裁员规模。但这场 “中国冲击”却助推唐纳德・特朗普上台，并催生了上世纪 30 年代以来最高的关税壁垒。
The white-collar employees threatened by AI have more political and social clout than factory workers hurt by Chinese competition. Even a small number of lay-offs could provoke a backlash against the technology; furious opposition to new data centres is a hint of what may be to come. Severe disruption to the security and status of many people could lead to widespread unrest, even revolution.
受人工智能冲击的白领群体，相比曾受中国市场竞争冲击的工厂工人，拥有更强的政治和社会影响力。即便只是小规模裁员，也可能引发民众对人工智能技术的强烈抵制；当下民众对新建数据中心的激烈反对，已然预示了未来的趋势。若大量民众的就业保障与社会地位遭受严重冲击，或将引发大范围社会动荡，甚至革命。
What should governments do? One set of ideas involves slowing down change. China has urged its companies to adopt AI, but not to lay off workers. Prominent economists around the world have proposed higher taxes on capital and lower ones on labour. Some campaigners want levies on data centres. Inhibiting technology is not, however, a wise path to choose. Humanity is likely to reap enormous benefits from AI: not just greater wealth, but progress fighting diseases and solving problems such as climate change and poverty. Had the Luddites stopped the automation of textile mills in early 19th-century England, the world would be far worse off today.
各国政府该如何应对？第一种思路是放缓变革节奏。中国鼓励企业应用人工智能，但同时要求不得裁员。全球知名经济学家纷纷提议提高资本税、降低劳动税，部分社会活动人士还主张对数据中心征税。然而，抑制技术发展并非明智之举。人工智能有望为人类带来巨大福祉：不仅能创造更多财富，还能助力攻克疾病、解决气候变化与贫困等全球性难题。倘若 19 世纪初英国卢德运动者阻止了纺织厂自动化进程，如今的世界将会糟糕得多。
A second category of countermeasures would be better. If employment falls, income that once went to workers is likely to show up as high profits in AI firms, chipmakers, data centres or elsewhere in the supply chain. Clever tax reforms, such as levies on corporate profits above a normal return on capital, on land and on natural resources, could capture these rents. The case for inheritance taxes to prevent the entrenchment of a capital-owning elite looks even stronger than before.
第二类应对举措更为可取。若就业岗位减少，原本流向劳动者的收入，大概率会转化为人工智能企业、芯片制造商、数据中心及产业链其他环节的高额利润。合理的税收改革（如对超出资本正常回报的企业利润、土地及自然资源征税），能够截留这部分超额收益。征收遗产税以防止资本精英阶层固化的必要性，如今也变得前所未有地突出。
At the same time governments could help workers adjust. Public wage-insurance, which smooths out falls in income after job losses, can help workers find better opportunities (and so can eventually pay for itself). Denmark’s active labour-market policies, in which the state helps people find and train for new occupations, have been proved to cut spellsin unemployment.
与此同时，政府可助力劳动者完成转型适应。公共薪资保险能够缓解失业后的收入下滑压力，帮助劳动者寻觅更好的就业机遇，最终也能实现收支自给。丹麦推行积极劳动力市场政策，由政府协助民众寻找新职业并开展技能培训，实践证明该政策能有效缩短民众失业周期。
These ideas would make the economy more efficient and fairer regardless of AI. Would they satisfy voters facing disruption and uncertainty? In a populist era technocratic reforms are a hard sell. Past efforts to help workers adjust to trade liberalisation failed to stop the “China shock” backlash. In an all-AI workforce, humans will need help surviving, not adjusting.
即便抛开人工智能的影响，这些举措也能提升经济效率、促进社会公平。但它们能否安抚身处变革动荡与不确定性中的选民？在民粹主义盛行的当下，技术官僚式改革难以获得民众支持。过去各国为帮助劳动者适应贸易自由化所做的努力，也未能阻止 “中国冲击”引发的民意反弹。在人工智能全面普及的就业环境下，人类需要的不只是转型适应帮扶，更是生存保障支持。
Hence a last set of radical ideas, such as the partial nationalisation of AI firms (see Free Exchange). This week a South Korean presidential adviser floateda citizens’ “dividend” from AI businesses, sending the local stockmarket down by 5%, before backtracking. In America politicians murmur about giving citizens shares in AI companies via “Trump accounts”. In economic terms there is little difference between a well-designed tax system and a government stake in the private sector--and countries without AI giants will have to rely on taxes rather than seizing shares in foreign companies. But America may find that some public ownership is the best way to make the social upsidefrom the technology transparent.
由此催生了最后一类激进举措，例如将人工智能企业部分国有化（详见自由交流专栏）。本周，韩国一位总统顾问提议向民众发放人工智能企业红利，该言论一度导致韩国股市大跌 5%，随后顾问又收回了这一提议。美国政界也有声音提议设立 “特朗普账户”，向民众分配人工智能企业股份。从经济学角度来看，一套设计完善的税收体系，与政府持有私营企业股份并无本质区别；而没有本土人工智能巨头的国家，只能依靠税收手段，无法参股外国科技企业。但美国可能会发现，适度的公有制是让技术带来的社会效益透明化的最佳途径
Concentrations of rent must be confronted early, before the power of rentiers is too great. The jobs apocalypse is not yet here. But if governments wait for conclusive evidence before creating a safety-net, it will be too late. Better to start now.
必须趁早遏制超额收益的过度集中，避免食利阶层势力坐大。就业危机尚未真正降临，但如果各国政府非要等到危机证据确凿才搭建安全保障网，那将为时已晚。不如即刻着手行动。
