《莫洛托夫访谈录》说明了什么问题?中英互译2

【原文】 莫洛托夫公然不顾白纸黑字的文献资料，说列宁“最肯定”斯大林而最警惕托洛茨基的“非常危险”性。

【英文】 Disregarding the written historical records, Molotov openly claimed that Lenin was “most affirmative” of Stalin while being most vigilant about Trotsky’s “extreme danger.”

【原文】 他说：“列宁遗嘱当然基本上对斯大林是有利的——纵观各种评价，斯大林是最受肯定的（！——引者）……他想提醒大家注意这个非常危险的人，所以把斯大林和托洛茨基并列——好吧，你们挑一个吧。关于斯大林，他公开的评价较少，但只有正面的。到后期他也说过斯大林的某些缺点。”（第359页）

【英文】 He said: “The Lenin Testament was certainly basically favorable to Stalin—considering all evaluations, Stalin was the most affirmed (! —quoted by the author)… He wanted to warn everyone about this extremely dangerous person, so he placed Stalin and Trotsky side by side—well, choose one. Regarding Stalin, there were fewer public evaluations, but they were only positive. Later, he did mention some of Stalin’s shortcomings.” (p. 359)

【原文】 事实上，在列宁最后两三年，在苏联成立的问题上，他反对斯大林的以俄罗斯为全联盟名称的大俄罗斯主义；反对斯大林关于南高加索三国无权以独立共和国名义加入苏联；对斯大林领导的工农检查院的工作不能令人满意；以及坚决反对削弱对外贸易垄断制等，列宁的主要批评对象都是斯大林，大量文献尚在。

【英文】 In fact, during the last two or three years of Lenin’s life, on the issue of forming the Soviet Union, he opposed Stalin’s Great Russian chauvinism regarding naming the union after Russia; he opposed Stalin’s view that the three South Caucasus republics had no right to join the USSR as independent republics; he was dissatisfied with the work of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate led by Stalin; and he firmly opposed weakening the foreign trade monopoly. In all these cases, Lenin’s main target of criticism was Stalin, as evidenced by abundant surviving documents.

【原文】 莫洛托夫还对斯大林的缺点采取回避的态度。当访问者问及斯大林有哪些缺点时，莫回答说：“‘缺点？我从来没有给自己提过这样的问题。’……大家都很喜欢他，我不愿意回忆他的短处。”（第364页）

【英文】 Molotov also adopted an evasive attitude toward Stalin’s shortcomings. When asked what Stalin’s shortcomings were, Molotov replied: “‘Shortcomings? I have never posed myself such a question.’ … Everyone liked him very much; I am unwilling to recall his faults.” (p. 364)

【原文】 在别处，莫洛托夫又强调大家都很怕斯大林，甚至说这是苏联得以生存的一个重要条件。

【英文】 Elsewhere, Molotov emphasized that everyone was terrified of Stalin, even stating that this was a crucial condition for the Soviet Union’s survival.

【原文】 在莫洛托夫看来，苏联的一切都依靠斯大林。没有了斯大林，也就没有了苏联。

【英文】 In Molotov’s view, everything in the Soviet Union depended on Stalin. Without Stalin, there would be no Soviet Union.

【原文】 莫说：“只要把斯大林杀了，再加上二三个人，一切就可能全完了。”（第361页）

【英文】 Molotov said: “Just kill Stalin, plus two or three others, and everything could be completely finished.” (p. 361)

【原文】 原来苏联的一亿几千万人民，都是靠了斯大林的保佑才能活命的。

【英文】 It turns out that the hundreds of millions of Soviet people survived only thanks to Stalin’s protection.

【原文】 至于其他的二三个人是谁，莫洛托夫没有说，照全书看，当然是莫洛托夫、卡冈诺维奇、伏罗希洛夫三剑客了。

【英文】 As for who those two or three others were, Molotov did not say. Judging from the entire book, they were naturally the trio of Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov.

【原文】 其实斯大林下面的真正掌权者是另外的三剑客，即马林科夫、日丹诺夫、贝利亚。

【英文】 In reality, the actual powerholders under Stalin were another trio: Malenkov, Zhdanov, and Beria.

【原文】 看起来，莫洛托夫对20世纪七八十年代的世事似乎什么也不知道。他乐观得很，但是也主观得出奇，他信心十足地说：“随着时间的推移，斯大林在俄国史上会得以恢复名誉，莫斯科将建一个斯大林博物馆。一定会这样！人们一定会提出这个要求。”（第364页）

【英文】 It seems Molotov knew nothing about world affairs in the 1970s and 80s. He was incredibly optimistic, yet strangely subjective. With full confidence, he said: “Over time, Stalin will be rehabilitated in Russian history. A Stalin Museum will be built in Moscow. It will definitely happen! People will surely demand it.” (p. 364)

【原文】 不过，莫洛托夫也还是说了一点对于斯大林神话不那么很美妙的东西，后文另说。

【英文】 However, Molotov did mention a few things that were not so flattering to the Stalin myth; that will be discussed separately later.

【原文】 莫洛托夫至死拥护并完全肯定他亲自参加的历次大镇压

【英文】 Molotov upheld and fully affirmed the various Great Purges he personally participated in until his dying breath

【原文】 莫洛托夫明确认为大镇压不需要任何证据，他认为大镇压还很不彻底，列宁的朋友都很可疑，赫鲁晓夫、米高扬、李维诺夫等人早就该杀了。

【英文】 Molotov explicitly believed the Great Purges required no evidence. He thought the purges were far from thorough enough; Lenin’s friends were all suspicious; Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Litvinov, and others should have been executed long ago.

【原文】 他至死反对给任何人平反，也反对从监狱和集中营释放任何人。

【英文】 Until his death, he opposed rehabilitating anyone or releasing anyone from prisons and labor camps.

【原文】 苏联大镇压的首要对象是老干部、老领导人，尤其是同列宁有过交往的人们。

【英文】 The primary targets of the Soviet Great Purges were veteran cadres and old leaders, especially those who had associated with Lenin.

【原文】 为了说明这么做的正确，莫洛托夫公开说：“列宁的朋友基本上都是一些可疑的人。”（第286页）

【英文】 To justify this, Molotov publicly stated: “Basically, all of Lenin’s friends were dubious individuals.” (p. 286)

【原文】 列宁的朋友既然全是坏人，当然就该都杀了。

【英文】 Since all of Lenin’s friends were bad people, of course they all deserved to be killed.

【原文】 为了拥护斯大林，莫洛托夫不惜如此诬蔑列宁，诬蔑党，诬蔑历史！

【英文】 To support Stalin, Molotov did not hesitate to slander Lenin, slander the Party, and slander history in this manner!

【原文】 莫洛托夫也承认，肃来肃去的结果，老布尔什维克已经所剩无几了。

【英文】 Molotov also admitted that after all the purging, very few Old Bolsheviks remained.

【原文】 他说：“我们党排除万难，坚持了既定路线，粉碎了托派分子、季诺维也夫分子和布哈林分子，虽说有缺点，虽说可靠的共产党人所剩无几，但……（下面意指斯大林和莫这样的人留下了，就取得了一切胜利）。”（第640页）

【英文】 He said: “Our Party overcame all difficulties, adhered to the set line, and crushed the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Bukharinites. Although there were shortcomings, although few reliable Communists remained, but… (implying that Stalin and people like Molotov remained and thus achieved all victories).” (p. 640)

【原文】 这就是说：老党员几乎全杀了，所剩无几。

【英文】 This means: almost all the veteran Party members were killed, with very few left.

【原文】 在莫洛托夫说这些话时，他既不惭愧，也不悲伤。

【英文】 When Molotov said these words, he showed neither shame nor sorrow.

【原文】 难道无产阶级革命家就应该是这样以杀尽自己的同志为职责的人吗？

【英文】 Should a proletarian revolutionary be someone whose duty is to kill off all their own comrades?

但是，在莫洛托夫看来，苏联的大屠杀还很不够。

However, in Molotov’s view, the Soviet Union’s purges were far from sufficient.

他明白指出，赫鲁晓夫、米高扬等没有被杀掉，就证明“大清洗”很不彻底。

He explicitly pointed out that the fact that Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and others were not killed proved that the “Great Purge” was far from thorough.

他尤其痛恨李维诺夫，说李维诺夫未被杀，纯属偶然，其实早该杀了。

He particularly hated Litvinov, saying that Litvinov’s survival was purely accidental and that he should have been killed long ago.

（莫洛托夫竟未看出斯大林为何要留下这张闲牌，在必要时可以打出去。）

(Molotov failed to see why Stalin kept this card up his sleeve, to be played when necessary.)

卫国战争爆发后，有一天，斯大林把李维诺夫叫来，没头没脑问他的外交礼服还在不在，李答还在。

After the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, one day Stalin summoned Litvinov and abruptly asked if his diplomatic uniform was still in his possession. Litvinov replied that it was.

斯大林叫他立刻动身到美国去当大使，礼服是现成的，立刻就走。

Stalin then ordered him to depart immediately for the United States to serve as ambassador. The uniform was ready, so he was to leave at once.

莫洛托夫奇妙地提出，是列宁笔下提到的极少数共产党人挽救了布尔什维克。

Molotov curiously claimed that it was the very few communists mentioned by Lenin in his writings who saved the Bolsheviks.

这就更奇了。他指的当然是斯和莫本人等。

This is even more curious. He was, of course, referring to Stalin, himself (Molotov), and others.

这是睁眼说瞎话。列宁多次提到斯大林，有时提到莫洛托夫，可是尖锐批评的时候多，表扬的时候很少。

This is a barefaced lie. Lenin mentioned Stalin on many occasions, and sometimes Molotov, but the remarks were mostly sharp criticisms, with very few words of praise.

最好的证明之一是，斯大林、日丹诺夫主编的《联共（布）党史简明教程》就没有怎么引用过列宁表扬斯大林的话（列宁比较重视斯大林的《马克思主义与民族问题》长文可能引用了），如果有，而且很多的话，能够不引用吗？

One of the best pieces of evidence is that the *Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, edited by Stalin and Zhdanov, hardly cited any of Lenin’s words praising Stalin (it might have cited Lenin’s greater regard for Stalin’s long article “Marxism and the National Question”). If such praise existed and was abundant, could they have possibly not cited it?

列宁真正郑重其事地提到的，是在遗嘱中道及的6个人。

The individuals Lenin truly and seriously mentioned were the six he spoke of in his testament.

这便是托洛茨基、斯大林、季诺维也夫、加米涅夫、布哈林、皮达可夫，其中批评最尖锐、最严厉的是对斯大林，直至提出要撤去他担任还不到一年的总书记职务。

These were Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Pyatakov. The sharpest and most severe criticism was directed at Stalin, going so far as to propose removing him from the post of General Secretary, which he had held for less than a year.

总书记，是中国人几十年来把它神化了，其实就是办公室主任、秘书主任，至多是秘书长这一类的意思，是事务性的，同领袖根本上是两回事。

The title of General Secretary has been deified by the Chinese for decades. In reality, it meant something like office director, chief secretary, or at most secretary-general—an administrative role, fundamentally different from that of a leader.

莫洛托夫的基本观点和基本政策是：对党内有任何不同意见的同志的唯一办法，就是放开手地予以消灭，而斯大林就是这么做的伟大英雄。

Molotov’s fundamental view and policy were: the only way to deal with comrades within the party who held any differing opinions was to eliminate them without restraint, and Stalin was the great hero who did just that.

莫洛托夫毫不知羞耻地夸奖他自己也是一个“内战内行”的大专家。

Molotov shamelessly boasted that he himself was also a great expert in “excelling at internal strife.”

他说：“列宁在世时，就有那么多不协调的、形形色色的反对派……总要有人放开手脚（！——引者）进行镇压。于是，斯大林就实际地承担起这种难题并加以解决。

He said: “Even when Lenin was alive, there were so many discordant, diverse opposition factions… Someone always had to take off the gloves (!—annotator’s note) and carry out the suppression. So, Stalin practically took on this difficult task and resolved it.

我以为，斯大林对此事的处理基本上是正确的（杀人也有‘基本上’正确之说！？——引者）。我们全力支持他，我是其中一个主要支持者，而且我对此至今不悔。”（第472页）

I believe Stalin’s handling of the matter was basically correct (can killing people be ‘basically’ correct!?—annotator’s note). We supported him fully. I was one of the principal supporters, and I have no regrets about it to this day.” (Page 472)

郭沫若在《韩非子批判》中，曾说过一句令人毛骨悚然的正确话，他说韩非的政治主张是那么的残忍，使人感到韩非的神经似乎是钢丝制成的一般。

In his *Critique of Han Feizi*, Guo Moruo once made a chillingly accurate statement, saying that Han Fei’s political propositions were so cruel that one felt as if Han Fei’s nerves were made of steel wire.

这是根据20世纪40年代读郭文时的记忆，确否未再查原文。

This is based on memory from reading Guo’s text in the 1940s; its accuracy has not been rechecked against the original.

现在看了莫洛托夫的谈话，又感到韩非算什么呢？比起莫洛托夫的神经来，韩非还软弱得很呢！

Now, having read Molotov’s conversation, one feels, what is Han Fei compared to this? Compared to Molotov’s nerves, Han Fei was still quite weak!

莫洛托夫无缘无故地、毫无根据地、反反复复地强调，1937年前后的苏联，似乎正处在危急存亡之秋，如果不反复地大规模推行大逮捕、大屠杀政策，苏联就要立刻完蛋。

Molotov repeatedly, groundlessly, and without reason emphasized that the Soviet Union around 1937 was seemingly on the brink of life and death, and that if large-scale policies of mass arrests and executions were not repeatedly implemented, the Soviet Union would immediately collapse.

“狼来了，狼来了！”狼是谁呢！不是希特勒，而是全国的党政军干部和老百姓。

“The wolf is coming, the wolf is coming!” Who was the wolf? Not Hitler, but the Party, government, and military cadres and the common people throughout the nation.

但是，在实际上正好相反，1935、1936年时，人们以为要赶上1928年的时期了（即“全盘集体化”的前一年），人民在经济生活上，至少在大城市，多少有了一点能够喘一口气的感觉。

But in reality, the opposite was true. In 1935 and 1936, people felt that they were catching up to the period of 1928 (the year before “wholesale collectivization”). In terms of economic life, at least in the major cities, the people had gained a slight sense of being able to catch their breath.

再加上苏联于1934年加入国际联盟，他们的天才外交家、一脸和气的老布尔什维克李维诺夫（他的作风同以后几十年由斯大林培养起来的外长莫洛托夫、维辛斯基、葛罗米柯这些顽石般的人物的作风根本不同），在国际联盟会议上，成年累月地呼吁推行“集体安全”政策，大国一致联合起来制止法西斯德国的侵略危险等等。

Furthermore, with the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations in 1934, their talented diplomat, the amiable-looking Old Bolshevik Litvinov (whose style was fundamentally different from the stony, unyielding styles of the foreign ministers cultivated by Stalin in the following decades—Molotov, Vyshinsky, Gromyko), spent years at League of Nations conferences tirelessly advocating for the “collective security” policy, urging the great powers to unite in stopping the aggressive danger of fascist Germany, and so on.

那时苏联在全世界的威信真是高极了：全世界都“左”倾了！同情和拥护苏联的力量在全世界大大地增强了。

At that time, the Soviet Union’s prestige in the world was extremely high: the whole world was leaning “left”! Sympathy and support for the Soviet Union greatly increased worldwide.

中国也完全是如此，1935—1937年，苏联在中国开明知识分子中的威望可谓达到了顶点。

China was no exception. From 1935 to 1937, the Soviet Union’s prestige among China’s enlightened intellectuals arguably reached its peak.

1936年，主要由布哈林起草的新宪法通过了（拉狄克也参与修改。通过宪法后，这两个人都相继被公开镇压了），在当时不明真相的世界进步人民面前真是耳目为之一新：人类的新曙光又一次照耀全世界了！

In 1936, the new constitution, primarily drafted by Bukharin (Radek also participated in its revision. After the constitution was passed, both men were subsequently publicly purged), was adopted. To the progressive people of the world who were unaware of the truth at the time, it was truly a breath of fresh air: a new dawn for humanity was once again shining upon the world!

可是，正在这个时期，苏联却忽然在全国，对上中下层的领导人和干部（包括驻外与援助西班牙反法西斯战争的一切人员）都开始了大规模的逮捕和屠杀运动。

Yet, precisely during this period, the Soviet Union suddenly launched a massive campaign of arrests and executions across the nation, targeting leaders and cadres at all levels—upper, middle, and lower (including all personnel stationed abroad and those aiding the Spanish anti-fascist war).

按西方新闻界的说法，整个苏联成了一部大绞肉机，日日夜夜在开足马力地工作。

According to the Western press, the entire Soviet Union had become a giant meat grinder, operating at full capacity day and night.

但是，莫洛托夫对此人类内部屠杀的空前惨剧却赞不绝口。

Yet, Molotov spoke in glowing terms of this unprecedented tragedy of internal human slaughter.

此事历史上找不到先例，希特勒的爱将隆美尔元帅参加了推翻希特勒的运动，希掌握了确证，令其自尽，但不宣布真相、然后予以国葬。

This event finds no precedent in history. Hitler’s beloved Field Marshal Rommel participated in the plot to overthrow Hitler. Hitler obtained conclusive evidence, ordered him to commit suicide, but did not announce the truth and then gave him a state funeral.

莫洛托夫说，如果那时不大捕大杀，苏联就生存不下去了：“没有1937年的肃反（引者按：1937年是习惯语，泛指斯大林时期的‘肃反’），我们也生存不下去……不对凶恶的敌人采取严酷措施，是不行的。”（第512页）

Molotov said that if they had not carried out mass arrests and executions at that time, the Soviet Union would not have survived: “Without the purges of 1937 (Note by the quoter: 1937 is a customary term, referring generally to the ‘purges’ during Stalin’s era), we also would not have survived… It is impossible not to take harsh measures against vicious enemies.” (Page 512)

莫洛托夫认为那时苏联已惶惶不可终日，国家已“危急之至”，如不大杀，就要“垮台”了：“如果不采取严厉措施，就会有更大危险，就会在艰难时刻使国家四分五裂。那时候，天知道会发生什么事，牺牲要大得多，要付出千百万人的牺牲，以至于垮台，无论如何，危急之至。”（第517页）

Molotov believed that the Soviet Union at that time was living in constant fear, the country was in “extreme peril,” and if they did not carry out mass killings, it would “collapse”: “If severe measures were not taken, there would be even greater danger, the country would be torn apart in difficult times. Then, who knows what would happen, the sacrifices would be much greater, costing the lives of millions, leading to collapse. In any case, the peril was extreme.” (Page 517)

全是废话、空话、骗人骗己的话，这些就是开足绞肉机的“根据”！

It was all nonsense, empty talk, words meant to deceive others and oneself—these were the “justifications” for running the meat grinder at full throttle!

莫洛托夫更莫名其妙地说，只有大捕大杀才是“救国救民”、“挽救革命”的唯一办法：“想想看，这一政策（按：指大规模镇压的政策）是挽救人民，挽救革命的唯一政策，是符合列宁主义及其基本原则的唯一政策。”

Even more inexplicably, Molotov stated that only mass arrests and killings were the sole method to “save the nation and its people” and “save the revolution”: “Think about it, this policy (referring to the policy of large-scale repression) is the only policy that can save the people, save the revolution, and the only policy that conforms to Leninism and its basic principles.”

1935—1939年这一特大镇压时期，怎么会突然出现要以开足绞肉机的马力来“挽救人民”、“挽救革命”的怪事呢？

How could such an absurdity—the need to run the meat grinder at full throttle to “save the people” and “save the revolution”—suddenly arise during the period of特大镇压 from 1935 to 1939?

而对于外敌——希特勒德国的生死威胁则一字不提，枪口完全对内，莫洛托夫竟还称之为“列宁主义”！

And not a single word was mentioned about the existential threat from the external enemy—Nazi Germany. The gun barrels were turned completely inward, yet Molotov still called this “Leninism”!

苏联大清洗

历史文本中英对照逐句译注

以下内容选自关于莫洛托夫与苏联大清洗的历史文献，逐句进行中英文对照翻译，保留原文的批判性叙述风格与历史细节。

外敌与内敌

像上述类似的话，充满全书。事实是，这时的外敌问题，无论德、日两个方向都还未达到立即就要爆发大战的程度，不存在箭在弦上的外敌压境的大危机。

Similar statements fill the entire book. The fact is, at this time, the external enemy situation—in both the German and Japanese directions—had not yet reached a point where a major war was imminent; there was no pressing crisis of foreign enemies massing at the gates.

这时期的唯一任务，就是加强团结，增强内部各方面的力量，准备迎接德、日两个法西斯侵略国的进攻。

The sole task of this period should have been to strengthen unity, enhance internal strength in all aspects, and prepare to meet the offensive of the two fascist aggressor nations, Germany and Japan.

强调抵抗德、日的人，如图哈切夫斯基元帅、布哈林[1934年在联共（布）十七大上他作了主要强调准备回击德国和日本侵略者的发言]等，均相继被杀了。

Those who emphasized resistance against Germany and Japan—such as Marshal Tukhachevsky and Bukharin [who, at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1934, delivered a major speech stressing preparation to repel German and Japanese aggressors]—were all subsequently killed.

但是，照莫洛托夫的说法，苏联的天就要塌下来了，而坍塌的原因，不是外敌，而是来自国内种种”可能”的敌人。

However, according to Molotov’s account, the sky over the Soviet Union was about to fall—and the cause of this collapse was not foreign enemies, but various “potential” enemies from within the country.

因此，当时”挽救危亡”的唯一方法就是加强内部大规模的盲目镇压，把党政军的中老干部都杀得近乎精光。

Therefore, the only way to “save the nation from peril” at that time was to intensify large-scale, indiscriminate internal repression, killing off virtually all the middle-aged and veteran cadres of the Party, government, and military.

军队中层（团）以上军官损失尤为惨重，几乎连锅端了。

The losses among military officers at the middle level (regiment) and above were particularly devastating—almost the entire pot was overturned.

朱可夫1939年夏在蒙古同日寇作战（诺门罕事件）中，发现尉级军官当师长，太误事了，华西列夫斯基在1939—1940年的苏联攻打芬兰的战争中也发现大量师长是尉官，因为”校”级军官几乎都杀光了。

In the summer of 1939, during the fighting against Japanese invaders in Mongolia (the Nomonhan Incident), Zhukov discovered lieutenants serving as division commanders—a most unfortunate situation. Vasilevsky also found during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940 that a large number of division commanders were junior officers, because almost all field-grade (“school”) officers had been killed.

“可能的敌人”

问题是：那些被杀、被流放的人真有罪并有丝毫的罪证吗？

The question is: Did those who were killed and exiled actually commit any crimes, and was there even a shred of evidence against them?

答案是完全没有，莫洛托夫也承认他们没有什么谋反及通敌罪证。

The answer is: absolutely none. Molotov himself admitted that they had no evidence of conspiracy or treason.

他们唯一的罪，就是被硬说为”信不过”、”不可靠”，”可能”在将来干坏事！

Their only “crime” was being arbitrarily labeled as “untrustworthy,” “unreliable,” and “potentially” capable of doing evil in the future!

莫洛托夫说：”1937年的肃反是必要的，应当看到，十月革命后，我们虽左右开弓，大开杀戒，取得了胜利。

Molotov said: “The 1937 purge was necessary. One must see that after the October Revolution, though we struck left and right, killing on a massive scale, we achieved victory.

但是，多种残余敌对势力还存在，法西斯侵略大敌当前，他们可能（！）纠集起来。

However, various remnants of hostile forces still existed, and with the great fascist aggressor looming before us, they might (!) band together.

我们幸亏于1937年搞了肃反，战时才没有出现第五纵队。”

Fortunately, we carried out the 1937 purge, so no fifth column appeared during the war.”

（引者按：第五纵队是1936—1939年西班牙反抗德、意法西斯假手国内叛军首领佛朗哥作乱时，敌方自称其派往共和军内部的奸细及内部的反对派是他们的”第五纵队”。）

(Editor’s note: The “fifth column” refers to the term used during the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, when the fascist German and Italian forces, acting through the rebel leader Franco, claimed that their spies and internal opponents sent into the Republican forces were their “fifth column.”)

即便在布尔什维克当中也有这样一些人：”当一切顺利时，党和国家尚未面临威胁时，他们是好的，是忠诚的，而一遇风吹草动，他们就会动摇，会投敌。”

Even among the Bolsheviks there were such people: “When everything was going well, when the Party and the state were not yet facing threats, they were good, they were loyal—but at the first sign of trouble, they would waver and defect to the enemy.”

（第465页）这是斯大林式的典型理论：即人人都可能是”特务”，人人都可能要投敌。

(p. 465) This is the typical Stalinist theory: that anyone could be a “spy,” anyone might defect to the enemy.

救治之法，就是先把他们通通杀光。

The remedy was to kill them all first.

问题是：按此理论，苏联已无可信之人，国家已无可用之兵，人人都可能是未来的叛国犯！

The problem is: according to this theory, there were no trustworthy people left in the Soviet Union, no usable soldiers for the state—everyone could potentially be a future traitor!

唯一救治之道，就是提前把他们先杀光！

The only remedy was to kill them all in advance!

这话是从莫洛托夫口中老实讲出的苏联领导人长期关门大屠杀的根本理论。

These words, spoken candidly by Molotov, reveal the fundamental theory behind the long-term, closed-door mass slaughter by Soviet leaders.

“执行路线不坚定”

布尔什维克中，究竟哪些人信得过，哪些人信不过？

Among the Bolsheviks, who exactly could be trusted, and who could not?

莫洛托夫说，凡”执行路线不坚定”的人，均在捕杀之列：

Molotov said that anyone who “did not firmly implement the line” was subject to arrest and execution:

“受到镇压的不仅有死硬的右派分子（注意：苏联在1938年初公开杀了布哈林以后，就始终把’右派’放在了托派之上，一直成为打击的重点对象，莫洛托夫在此也是如此。——引者注）或托洛茨基分子（这是理所当然的），而且还有许多动摇分子，这些人执行路线不坚定，当然也就无法相信他们在困难时刻不会叛变投敌。

“Those who were suppressed included not only die-hard Rightists (note: after the Soviet Union publicly executed Bukharin in early 1938, they always placed ‘Rightists’ above Trotskyites, making them the primary target of attack—Molotov does the same here. —Editor’s note) or Trotskyites (which goes without saying), but also many wavering elements. These people did not firmly implement the line, so naturally one could not trust them not to defect to the enemy in difficult times.

尽管如此，赫鲁晓夫之流还是蒙混过关，米高扬之流还是躲了过去，还有一些人……”

Despite this, the likes of Khrushchev still slipped through, the likes of Mikoyan still escaped, and there were others…”

（第466页）可见，莫洛托夫恨的是没有都杀光。

(p. 466) It is evident that what Molotov resented was that they were not all killed.

其实，一个该举的例子他却没有提到，就是苏联的一个集团军司令弗拉索夫中将确实在战时投敌了，成为伪军”俄罗斯解放军”的总司令。

In fact, there is one example he failed to mention: Lieutenant General Vlasov, a Soviet army group commander, did indeed defect during the war and became the commander-in-chief of the puppet “Russian Liberation Army.”

照莫洛托夫的理论，为避免发生弗拉索夫事件，就要在战前把苏军的排长以上的军官都杀光，才不会出现弗拉索夫这样的叛军司令！

According to Molotov’s theory, to prevent a Vlasov incident, one would have had to kill all Soviet officers above the rank of platoon leader before the war, so that no rebel commander like Vlasov could emerge!

按照莫洛托夫的荒唐逻辑（谁都知道莫洛托夫并不是这个荒唐逻辑的发明人），就不能不把苏联人都杀光，这样才能保证在将来不出一个坏人。

According to Molotov’s absurd logic (and everyone knows Molotov was not the inventor of this absurd logic), one would have no choice but to kill all Soviet people, so as to guarantee that not a single bad person would appear in the future.

这段历史文本揭示了苏联大清洗时期”预防性镇压”的荒诞逻辑——以”可能的叛变”为由，将无辜者视为必须清除的隐患。莫洛托夫的言论成为这一历史悲剧的冰冷注脚。

莫洛托夫访谈录

历史文献中英对照逐句译注

第四部分：绞肉机的辩护词

一、大屠杀的”功勋”

上述论点不是推测，而是莫洛托夫明确而强调地讲出来的。

The above arguments were not speculations, but were explicitly and emphatically stated by Molotov.

莫洛托夫的访问者（包括有时同去访问的其他几人），从根本上说，都是与莫洛托夫同调的。

Molotov’s interviewers (including several others who sometimes accompanied him on visits) were, fundamentally speaking, all in tune with Molotov.

（不然他们怎么能有139次之多呢？）

(Otherwise, how could there have been as many as 139 sessions?)

有一次访问者对莫洛托夫的”肃反”功勋表示感激时，就出现了这么两句对话：

Once, when an interviewer expressed gratitude for Molotov’s “purging” merits, the following exchange occurred:

“你们进行了斗争，对你们无可指责。”

“You carried out the struggle; you are beyond reproach.”

“不，应该指责斗争得不力，没有把坏蛋通通打死！”

“No, you should blame us for not fighting hard enough, for not killing all the villains!”

一个是感谢他们过去大屠杀的历史功勋；一个是感到还杀得太不够，十分抱歉。

One expressed gratitude for their historical merits in the past massacres; the other felt deeply sorry that not enough people had been killed.

天呀，这是什么”马克思主义”、”社会主义”呀！

Good heavens, what kind of “Marxism” and “socialism” is this!

这不是一群杀人魔鬼的大合唱吗？

Is this not a grand chorus of murderous demons?

这样的政权不垮台，人间还有真理吗？

If such a regime does not collapse, is there still any truth left in this world?

二、”要什么证据！”

如此大规模地捕人杀人，要不要什么证据呢？

For such large-scale arrests and killings, was any evidence required?

感谢高举斯大林红旗的莫洛托夫同志，他回答得很干脆，要什么证据！

Thanks to Comrade Molotov, who held high Stalin’s red banner, he answered quite bluntly: what evidence is needed!

请看下面的回答：

Please see the following response:

问：”可是，现在有人说，公诉书中除去被告自供以外，没有任何算得上是罪证的事实。”

Question: “But now some people say that apart from the defendants’ confessions, the indictments contained no facts that could be considered evidence of guilt.”

莫洛托夫答道：”既然已经知道他们犯了罪，他们是敌人，还需要什么罪证！

Molotov replied: “Since it is already known that they committed crimes and that they are enemies, what evidence is still needed!

您念念布哈林的供词就知道他是个机会主义分子！

Read Bukharin’s confession and you will know he was an opportunist!

不是还想搞富农叛乱吗？”（第482页）

Didn’t he still want to stage a kulak rebellion?” (p. 482)

三、大镇压的公式

莫洛托夫可算道尽了他们”肃反”的真相，你现在或将来可能做坏事，所以把你抓起来；

Molotov thoroughly revealed the truth of their “purges”: you might do something bad now or in the future, so you are arrested;

然后是刑讯逼供、指供；

then comes torture to extract confessions and directed testimony;

然后是取得一切所需要的口供；

then obtaining all the confessions needed;

然后定案；

then the case is closed;

然后是维辛斯基的血腥演说起诉；

then comes Vyshinsky’s bloody prosecutorial speech;

然后是明正典刑！

then comes the formal execution!

这就是千篇一律的大镇压公式。

This is the stereotyped formula of the Great Purge.

证据是绝对丝毫不要的。

Evidence is absolutely not required in the slightest.

（莫洛托夫夫人于1949年初被逮捕后也被指供：莫洛托夫拥护斯大林是假的。

(After Molotov’s wife was arrested in early 1949, she was also forced to confess: Molotov’s support for Stalin was false.

莫洛托夫的杀头之罪不是已准备好了吗？

Wasn’t the capital crime for Molotov already prepared?

莫洛托夫在访谈录中对此事是讲得清清楚楚的。）

Molotov spoke clearly about this matter in the interview records.)

四、坚持一切正确

莫洛托夫坚持大屠杀时期的一切都是完全正确的。

Molotov insisted that everything during the period of mass killings was entirely correct.

他在书中无数次地坚持确认，当时总检察长维辛斯基的国家公诉书，最高法院军事法庭的判决书，和”犯人”的所谓”口供”全都是正确的，因此也就全都永远有效。

In his book, he repeatedly insisted and confirmed that the state indictments of Prosecutor General Vyshinsky at that time, the verdicts of the Supreme Court’s Military Collegium, and the so-called “confessions” of the “prisoners” were all correct and therefore permanently valid.

因篇幅关系，这里从略。

Due to space limitations, this is omitted here.

但有一趣事似仍应提一下，莫洛托夫在1974年12月的一次谈话中，仍认为布哈林是1918年刺杀列宁的主谋人。

But one interesting matter is still worth mentioning: in a conversation in December 1974, Molotov still believed that Bukharin was the mastermind behind the 1918 assassination attempt on Lenin.

他说，”在我看来，他（按：指布哈林）至少参与了社会革命党人杀害列宁的阴谋。

He said, “In my view, he (referring to Bukharin) was at least involved in the Socialist Revolutionaries’ conspiracy to kill Lenin.

他原先主张逮捕列宁。

He originally advocated arresting Lenin.

但那时候已到了两军对垒生死存亡的关头，斗争已发展到要处决列宁的程度”。

But by then it had reached a critical moment of life and death between two opposing armies, and the struggle had developed to the point of executing Lenin.”

五、赤裸裸的谎言

莫洛托夫明知他是在大扯其谎。

Molotov knew full well that he was telling a blatant lie.

因为正是布哈林是党内高层领导中唯一坚持劝告列宁那天晚上不要到某工厂去演讲的人。

For it was precisely Bukharin who, among the high-ranking party leaders, was the only one who insisted on advising Lenin not to go speak at a certain factory that evening.

此事在1935年出版的列宁夫人克鲁普斯卡娅写的《列宁回忆录》中写得清清楚楚。

This is clearly written in Krupskaya’s “Memoirs of Lenin,” published in 1935.

（出版时，斯大林去电话向克鲁普斯卡娅祝贺，然后即发动波斯伯洛夫等在《真理报》上公开发表文章对克鲁普斯卡娅进行毁灭性的攻击，而波斯伯洛夫此时正是”斯大林同志秘书处”的宣传处长。）

(Upon its publication, Stalin telephoned Krupskaya to congratulate her, then immediately launched Poskrebyshev and others to publish articles in Pravda openly attacking Krupskaya with devastating criticism, while Poskrebyshev was at that time the head of the propaganda department of “Comrade Stalin’s Secretariat.”)

莫洛托夫会没有看过吗？

Could Molotov not have read it?

列宁夫人回忆录载，当天中午，布哈林在列宁家中吃饭，（列宁待布哈林如家人子弟，并公开在”遗嘱”中讲布哈林是全党最喜欢的人。）

Lenin’s wife’s memoirs record that at noon that day, Bukharin was having lunch at Lenin’s home (Lenin treated Bukharin like family, and publicly stated in his “testament” that Bukharin was the most beloved person in the entire Party.)

席间，布哈林得悉列宁当晚要到两个工厂去演讲，而头一天乌里茨基（列宁格勒肃反委员会主席）刚刚被刺，因此就劝列宁不要去演讲。

During the meal, Bukharin learned that Lenin was scheduled to speak at two factories that evening, and since Uritsky (Chairman of the Petrograd Cheka) had just been assassinated the day before, he therefore advised Lenin not to go speak.

请看列宁夫人是怎么写的吧：

Please see how Lenin’s wife wrote about it:

“当谎言成为权力的话语，历史便成了任人打扮的小姑娘。”

—— 关于莫洛托夫访谈录的反思