国外权威期刊目录JAERE·环境与资源经济学家协会杂志(总第637期)

Qing Ji,Chunan Wang,Xiaoyong Zheng, and Ying Fan

我们评估了2015年至2019年中国电动汽车补贴政策对福利的影响。我们的研究结果显示，这些补贴主要将资金从政府转移到消费者，汽车制造商只获得了很小的份额。这一结果由电动汽车需求曲线超过一以及消费者价格敏感度的显著异质性所驱动。我们进一步将福利效应分解为两个关键组成部分：基于行驶里程的基线补贴和针对技术创新的补贴调整系数。虽然后者加剧了电动汽车之间的竞争，减少了制造商利润，但也通过降低排放提升了环境效益。最后，我们的结果强调了考虑非环境外部性——如交通事故和拥堵——以及福利分析中外部选择背后的交通方式假设的必要性。改变这些假设可能会对整体社会福利效应产生相反的结论。

Wenjun Wang and Sébastien Houde

This study investigates the distributional welfare effects of the trade tariffs initiated by the US government against Chinese solar manufacturers between 2012 and 2018. We estimate a structural econometric model that incorporates the vertical structure between upstream solar manufacturers and downstream solar installers. Counterfactual simulations show that the tariffs had a small positive impact on US manufacturers but a large negative impact on US installers. Chinese manufacturers were also negatively affected economically. Moreover, we estimate the tariff pass-through rate, which we find to exceed one due to the imperfectly competitive nature of the industry. Ultimately, the burden of the solar trade war thus fell disproportionately on US consumers.

本研究调查了美国政府在2012年至2018年间对中国太阳能制造商征收的贸易关税对分配福利的影响。我们估算了一个结构计量经济模型，该模型包含了上游太阳能制造商与下游太阳能安装商之间的垂直结构。反事实模拟显示，关税对美国制造商产生了小幅正面影响，但对美国安装商产生了巨大负面影响。中国制造商在经济上也受到了负面影响。此外，我们估算了关税通过率，发现由于行业竞争不够充分，该率超过一。最终，太阳能贸易战的负担因此不成比例地落在了美国消费者身上。

Stephen P. Holland,Matthew J. Kotchen,Erin T. Mansur, and Andrew J. Yates

In this study, we examine the feasibility of immediately phasing down US coal-generated electricity given the existing fleet of power plants. We take consumption as given and evaluate how prioritizing natural gas generation over that of coal would change emissions and operating costs. To do this, we develop a replacement algorithm based on transmission regions and marginal cost comparisons. We find that between 66% and 94% of coal generation could be replaced immediately, reducing electricity sector CO2 emissions between 18% and 29%—equivalent to between 5% and 8% of total US energy-related emissions. The cost range is between $49 and $92 per ton of CO2, where benefit-cost ratios are favorable in some scenarios considering local pollutant cobenefits alone. Despite the command-and-control nature of prioritizing natural gas generation, we find it relatively cost-effective even in comparison to a Pigouvian tax.

本研究探讨了鉴于现有电厂群，立即逐步减少美国燃煤发电的可行性。我们以既定消费为前提，评估将天然气发电优先于煤炭将如何影响排放和运营成本。为此，我们基于传输区域和边际成本比较开发了替换算法。我们发现，66%至 94%的煤炭发电可以立即更换，电力部门的 CO2 排放减少 18%至 29%，相当于美国能源相关排放的 5%至 8%。成本范围为每吨二氧化碳 49 至 92 美元，在某些情境中，仅考虑本地污染物的共益，效益成本比较为有利。尽管优先发展天然气具有命令与控制性质，但我们发现即使与皮古税相比，它也相对具有成本效益。

Christoph Böhringer and Carsten Helm

Deep decarbonization requires electrification of energy-related processes across all sectors of the economy. This so-called sector coupling has important implications for quantity-based regulations in the electricity sector which overlap with measures that promote electricity-based technologies in other sectors, like subsidies for electric vehicles, CO2 taxes on fossil technologies, or a separate ETS in the transport and buildings sectors. We show this for emissions trading systems (ETS) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). The switch to electricity-based technologies usually strengthens an existing RPS. For the EU ETS, the switch raises demand for emission allowances in countries with such additional policies, but emission reductions come from all countries within the ETS. There is thus a reverse waterbed effect. Numerical simulations for overlapping regulations in the EU and the US underpin the policy relevance. They suggest that overlapping policies should generally target sectors not covered by quantity instruments such as an ETS or RPS.

深度脱碳需要经济各部门能源相关流程的电气化。这种所谓的行业耦合对电力行业的数量型监管具有重要影响，这些法规与促进其他行业电力技术的措施重叠，如电动汽车补贴、化石技术的二氧化碳税， 或交通和建筑行业的独立 ETS。我们对排放交易系统（ETS）和可再生能源投资组合标准（RPS）进行了展示。转向电力技术通常会加强现有的 RPS。对于欧盟 ETS 来说，这一转变增加了在实施此类额外政策的国家对排放配额的需求，但减排来自 ETS 内所有国家。因此存在反向水床效应。欧盟和美国重叠法规的数值模拟支持了该政策的相关性。他们建议，重叠政策通常应针对未被 ETS 或 RPS 等数量工具覆盖的行业。

Ben Balmford,Brett Day,Ian Bateman, and Greg Smith

We propose and explore, both in theory and the laboratory, a mechanism to incentivize optimal individual abatement effort in groups of polluters when individual-level monitoring is costly. The mechanism we propose is a hybrid; rewarding agents for the achievement of a group-level target, while allowing individuals to protect themselves against coordination failure by electing to purchase individual-level monitoring. By exerting optimal individual effort, a monitored agent can guarantee their reward irrespective of group behavior. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterized by group members exerting optimal levels of individual effort while not purchasing monitoring. Thus, the hybrid mechanism disincentivizes free riding without realizing monitoring costs. Laboratory experiments confirm that the hybrid mechanism offers welfare gains compared to stand-alone lump-sum group-level incentives and instruments mandating individual-level monitoring. Moreover, the hybrid mechanism maintains levels of efficiency comparable to a group tax but with more desirable out-of-equilibrium properties.

我们提出并探索理论和实验室中，一种机制，在个别层面监测成本高昂时，激励污染群体进行最佳个体减排努力。我们提出的机制是一种混合型;奖励达成群体层面目标的代理人，同时允许个体通过购买个人层面监测来保护自己免受协调失败。通过施加最佳个体努力，受监控的主体可以保证无论群体行为如何都能获得奖励。我们表明，独特的纳什均衡特征是组员在不购买监测的情况下，投入最佳的个人努力水平。因此，混合机制抑制了搭便车的动力，却忽视了监控成本。实验室实验证实，混合机制相比单独的一次性群体激励和强制个人监测的工具，在福利方面有所提升。此外，混合机制保持了与集体税相当的效率水平，但具有更理想的非均衡特性。

Prakrati Thakur

China banned imports of several waste categories beginning in 2017. Exploiting variation between banned waste materials and exempt regular materials, I combine a difference-in-differences approach with the gravity model of trade to estimate its impact on global waste flows. My results show that the ban led to an overall decline in international waste flows, primarily through the reduction in imports by China. While some of the low-value waste materials like plastics were diverted to other lower-income countries, overall trade in high-value waste like metals declined. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that low-income countries saved 1.3–3.8 billion USD in external costs by 2020, roughly 14%–32% of the savings by China. My results indicate that a unilateral regulation can meaningfully lower environmental costs beyond the regulation-imposing country.

中国自2017年起禁止进口若干废弃物类别。利用被禁止废弃物与豁免常规材料之间的差异，我结合了差中差分方法与贸易引力模型，估算其对全球废物流动的影响。我的调查结果显示，禁令整体导致国际废弃物流量下降，主要通过中国减少进口。虽然一些低价值废弃物如塑料被转运到其他低收入国家，但整体上高价值废物如金属的贸易有所下降。粗略计算显示，到2020年，低收入国家节省了13亿至38亿美元的外部成本，约占中国节省的14%至32%。我的结果表明，单边监管可以实质性地降低环境成本，超出监管国家范围。

Erik Katovich,Dominic Parker, and Steven Poelhekke

Sectoral expansions and contractions cause labor reallocation out of declining industries and into booming industries. Which types of workers gain and lose from these transitions? Using linked employer-employee panel data from Brazil spanning boom-bust cycles in its oil sector, we compare oil entrants with closely matched workers hired into other sectors in the same year. We find that entry timing interacts with worker skill in ways that have lasting effects. Only highly educated workers hired into oil at the onset of a boom reap persistent earnings premiums across the boom-bust cycle. For most later entrants, especially low-education workers, the decision to enter the oil industry results in persistent unemployment and earnings penalties. We document mechanisms underlying this first-in, last-out pattern. Accumulated experience in professional occupations insulates high-education early entrants from downturns, while a boom in sector-specific training programs intensifies competition among later entrants. We discuss implications for energy transitions.

行业扩张和收缩导致劳动力从衰退行业重新分配到繁荣行业。哪些类型的员工从这些转变中受益或失去？我们利用巴西跨越石油行业繁荣与萧条周期的雇主-雇员面板数据，将石油新入行者与同年其他行业聘用的匹配工人进行比较。我们发现入职时机与工人技能的交互作用产生持久影响。只有在繁荣开始时被雇佣进入石油行业的高学历工人，才能在繁荣与崩溃周期中持续保持盈利溢价。对于大多数后期进入者，尤其是低学历工人来说，选择进入石油行业会导致持续的失业和收入罚款。我们记录了这种先进后出模式背后的机制。积累的专业职业经验使高学历的早期入行者免受经济低迷影响，而行业特定培训项目的兴起则加剧了后入者之间的竞争。我们讨论了能源转型的影响。

编辑：史绍杉

审核：马慧芳

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