AI 会不会砸掉所有人的饭碗?

The Economist · 科技 · C1-C2

The launch of ChatGPT in 2022 ignited the artificial-intelligence boom – and elicited a chorus of warnings from AI bosses of an impending jobs apocalypse. Never mind that they have reason to talk up the disruptiveness of their products, or that rich-world employment is near all-time highs – the dark message has landed. Seven in 10 Americans think AI will make it harder for people to find work; nearly a third fear for their own jobs. A dearth of openings for college graduates – especially computer programmers – amplifies the dread.

The past offers some solace for the anxious. Labour markets constantly change. Today's offices would be unrecognisable to a worker from 50 years ago. Never in modern history has technological progress hurt the overall demand for human labour. Economic historians now play down the magnitude of "Engels' pause", the period during the Industrial Revolution in which working-class wages grew more slowly than the wider economy.

Yet history is not always a good guide to the future, as the Industrial Revolution itself showed. The top AI models are awesome. They can tackle much more complex coding tasks than people were predicting a year ago. The number of AI agents has exploded. Spending on AI by businesses is up dramatically. Annualised recurring revenue of Anthropic, a hot model-maker, is set to reach $50bn by the end of June. There is no evidence yet in the labour-market data of AI destroying many jobs. But given how fast it is improving, it would be rash to dismiss fears that it will. Society may be on the verge of a profound reallocation of resources, and political upheaval.

Economists' prediction that work will stay plentiful is less reassuring than it looks, especially over a long horizon. Though the market will find uses for human labour even as models and robots become more capable, the quality of those jobs and the wages they pay are not guaranteed. Data centres will account for 8.5% of America's peak power demand in 2027, up from 4.1% in 2025, Goldman Sachs predicts. As AI firms bid up the price of land and energy, the dollars people earn will go less far. Eventually humans could, like horses in the age of the car, become uneconomical. Income may go mostly or entirely to owners of capital, who then go on to spend it on things that are made by AI and robots using natural resources that they monopolise.

This dystopian possibility is behind Silicon Valley's admonitions that state intervention, and perhaps a universal basic income, will be necessary. That remains a long way off, if it ever happens. But governments may have to act sooner, for you do not need a cataclysm to stoke popular fury. Perhaps 2m Americans lost their jobs between 1999 and 2011 owing to China's entry into the global trading system. That is no worse than a typical month's layoffs in America's churning labour market. Yet the "China shock" helped propel Donald Trump to office and led to the highest tariffs since the 1930s.

The white-collar employees threatened by AI have more political and social clout than factory workers hurt by Chinese competition. Even a small number of layoffs could provoke a backlash against the technology; furious opposition to new data centres is a hint of what may be to come. Severe disruption to the security and status of many people could lead to widespread unrest, even revolution.

What should governments do? One set of ideas involves slowing down change. China has urged its companies to adopt AI, but not to lay off workers. Prominent economists around the world have proposed higher taxes on capital and lower ones on labour. Some campaigners want levies on data centres. Inhibiting technology is not, however, a wise path to choose. Humanity is likely to reap enormous benefits from AI: not just greater wealth, but progress fighting diseases and solving problems such as climate change and poverty. Had the Luddites stopped the automation of textile mills in early 19th-century England, the world would be far worse off today.

A second category of countermeasures would be better. If employment falls, income that once went to workers is likely to show up as high profits in AI firms, chipmakers, data centres or elsewhere in the supply chain. Clever tax reforms, such as levies on corporate profits that are above a normal return on capital, on land and on natural resources, could capture these rents. The case for inheritance taxes to prevent the entrenchment of a capital-owning elite looks even stronger than before.

At the same time governments could help workers adjust. Public wage-insurance, which smooths out falls in income after job losses, can help workers find better opportunities (and so can eventually pay for itself). Denmark's active labour-market policies, in which the state helps people find and train for new occupations, have been proved to cut spells in unemployment.

These ideas would make the economy more efficient and fairer regardless of AI. Would they satisfy voters facing disruption and uncertainty? In a populist era technocratic reforms are a hard sell. Past efforts to help workers adjust to trade liberalisation failed to stop the "China shock" backlash. In an all-AI workforce, humans will need help surviving, not adjusting.

Hence a last set of radical ideas, such as the partial nationalisation of AI firms. This week confusion over a South Korean presidential adviser's proposed citizens' "dividend" from AI businesses, funded by excess tax revenues, helped to send the local stockmarket down by 5%, before it recovered. In America politicians murmur about giving citizens shares in AI companies via "Trump accounts". In economic terms there is little difference between a well-designed tax system and a government stake in the private sector – and countries without AI giants will have to rely on taxes rather than seizing shares in foreign companies. But America may find that some public ownership is the best way to make the social upside from the technology transparent.

Concentrations of rent must be confronted early, before the power of rentiers is too great. The jobs apocalypse is not yet here. But if governments wait for conclusive evidence before creating a safety-net, it will be too late. Better to start now.

"It is not here yet. But governments should lay a safety-net."

它尚未到来。但各国政府应当未雨绸缪，铺设好安全网。

The launch of ChatGPT in 2022 ignited the artificial-intelligence boom – and elicited a chorus of warnings from AI bosses of an impending jobs apocalypse. Never mind that they have reason to talk up the disruptiveness of their products, or that rich-world employment is near all-time highs – the dark message has landed. Seven in 10 Americans think AI will make it harder for people to find work; nearly a third fear for their own jobs. A dearth of openings for college graduates – especially computer programmers – amplifies the dread.

2022 年 ChatGPT 的问世点燃了人工智能热潮——也引发了 AI 公司高管们对就业末日迫近的一齐警告。尽管这些人有理由夸大自家产品的颠覆性，尽管富裕国家的就业率已接近历史高位——这番末日预言却已深入人心。七成美国人认为 AI 将使求职更加困难；近三成人担忧自己的饭碗不保。应届大学毕业生——尤其是计算机程序员——岗位的匮乏，更是加剧了这种恐慌。

The past offers some solace for the anxious.

历史能给忧心忡忡的人们一些安慰。

Yet history is not always a good guide to the future, as the Industrial Revolution itself showed.

然而历史并非总能指引未来，工业革命本身便是前车之鉴。

Economists' prediction that work will stay plentiful is less reassuring than it looks, especially over a long horizon.

经济学家关于就业机会依然充裕的预判，安慰作用远不如表面上看起来那般强，从长远来看尤其如此。

This dystopian possibility is behind Silicon Valley's admonitions that state intervention, and perhaps a universal basic income, will be necessary.

正是这种反乌托邦式的可能性，促使硅谷人士疾呼国家干预之必要，甚至呼吁推行全民基本收入。

The white-collar employees threatened by AI have more political and social clout than factory workers hurt by Chinese competition.

受 AI 威胁的白领员工，比受中国竞争冲击的工厂工人拥有更多的政治和社会影响力。

What should governments do? One set of ideas involves slowing down change.

各国政府该怎么办？一种思路是放慢变革的脚步。

A second category of countermeasures would be better.

第二类对策会更好。

At the same time governments could help workers adjust.

与此同时，政府可以帮助劳动者转型适应。

Hence a last set of radical ideas, such as the partial nationalisation of AI firms.

因此出现了最后一类激进设想，比如对 AI 企业实行部分国有化。

Concentrations of rent must be confronted early, before the power of rentiers is too great.

必须在食利者的权力过于膨胀之前，及早遏制租金的集中。

AI may not have destroyed jobs yet, but governments must build safety-nets now — through tax reform, worker retraining and even partial public ownership — before disruption becomes politically explosive.

AI 也许尚未摧毁就业，但政府必须现在就开始构建安全网——通过税收改革、劳动者再培训乃至部分公有制——在颠覆性冲击演变为政治爆炸之前未雨绸缪。

Economists' prediction that work will stay plentiful is less reassuring than it looks, especially over a long horizon. Though the market will find uses for human labour even as models and robots become more capable, the quality of those jobs and the wages they pay are not guaranteed. Data centres will account for 8.5% of America's peak power demand in 2027, up from 4.1% in 2025, Goldman Sachs predicts. As AI firms bid up the price of land and energy, the dollars people earn will go less far. Eventually humans could, like horses in the age of the car, become uneconomical. Income may go mostly or entirely to owners of capital, who then go on to spend it on things that are made by AI and robots using natural resources that they monopolise.

经济学家关于就业机会依然充裕的预判，安慰作用远不如表面上看起来那般强，从长远来看尤其如此。即便模型与机器人的能力日益增强，市场或许仍能为人类劳动力找到用武之地，但那些工作的质量和薪酬水平却无从保证。高盛预测，到 2027 年，数据中心将占美国电力峰值需求的 8.5%，而 2025 年这一比例仅为 4.1%。随着 AI 公司不断哄抬土地与能源价格，人们赚取的美元实际购买力也将随之缩水。人类最终或许会像汽车时代的马匹一样，在经济上失去存在的价值。收入可能大部分乃至全部归属于资本所有者，而他们消费的，也将是 AI 与机器人利用其垄断的自然资源所生产的商品。

What should governments do? One set of ideas involves slowing down change. China has urged its companies to adopt AI, but not to lay off workers. Prominent economists around the world have proposed higher taxes on capital and lower ones on labour. Some campaigners want levies on data centres. Inhibiting technology is not, however, a wise path to choose. Humanity is likely to reap enormous benefits from AI: not just greater wealth, but progress fighting diseases and solving problems such as climate change and poverty. Had the Luddites stopped the automation of textile mills in early 19th-century England, the world would be far worse off today.

各国政府该怎么办？一种思路是放慢变革的脚步。中国已敦促其企业采用 AI，但不得裁员。全球知名经济学家提议对资本征收更高的税、对劳动征收更低的税。一些活动人士则希望对数据中心征税。然而，抑制技术发展并非明智之选。人类有望从 AI 中收获巨大的利益：不仅是更多的财富，还包括对抗疾病以及解决气候变化和贫困等问题的进展。倘若当年卢德分子真的阻止了 19 世纪早期英格兰纺织厂的自动化，今天的世界只会糟糕得多。

“Never mind that they have reason to talk up the disruptiveness of their products, or that rich-world employment is near all-time highs – the dark message has landed.”

用法：让步——转折结构。Never mind that 先抛出两个本应削弱恐慌的理由（有夸大动机＋就业率很高），破折号后用 the message has landed 一锤定音——道理归道理，恐惧已经扎根。雅思写作中论证“某现象虽不合理但已成事实”时极其好用。

“Had the Luddites stopped the automation of textile mills in early 19th-century England, the world would be far worse off today.”

用法：省略 if 的虚拟语气倒装。Had＋主语＋过去分词＝If＋主语＋had＋过去分词。用于反事实假设（历史没有发生的事），是 C2 级语法点，也是雅思写作 7＋ 的加分句式。论证“不应阻挡技术进步”时一击致命。

The Economist warns that while AI has not yet caused mass unemployment, governments must act preemptively — through tax reform, worker retraining, and possibly partial public ownership of AI firms — before technological disruption fuels political upheaval.

《经济学人》警告称，尽管 AI 尚未造成大规模失业，但政府必须未雨绸缪——通过税收改革、劳动者再培训乃至对 AI 企业的部分公有制——在技术颠覆引发政治动荡之前采取行动。

1apocalypse/əˈpɒkəlɪps/

释义：大灾变，末日（the apocalypse = 世界末日）

原句：...warnings from AI bosses of an impending jobs apocalypse.

自造例句：

2backlash/ˈbæklæʃ/

释义：强烈反弹，激烈抵制（against sth.）

原句：Even a small number of layoffs could provoke a backlash against the technology.

自造例句：

3rentier/ˈrɒntɪeɪ/

释义：食利者，靠租金/投资收入生活的人

原句：Concentrations of rent must be confronted early, before the power of rentiers is too great.

自造例句：

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