夜雨聆风
尽管长期存在公开竞争和分歧，OpenAI、Anthropic、Google AI、Microsoft AI等AI巨头的CEO们罕见地联合致信美国国会，呼吁立法强制要求对合成核酸（DNA）订单进行筛查和记录保存，以防止AI技术降低生物武器开发门槛后带来的国家安全威胁。
1. 罕见的行业联盟
- Sam Altman（OpenAI）和Dario Amodei（Anthropic）多年来公开冲突不断：从OpenAI的技术路线分歧，到Anthropic公开批评OpenAI与美国国防部的合同
- 如今两人放下分歧，联合Demis Hassabis（Google AI）、Mustafa Suleyman（Microsoft AI）等共同发声，显示该议题的紧迫性和重要性已超越商业竞争
2. 核心诉求：强制筛查合成核酸
- 呼吁国会立法，强制要求合成DNA提供商和合成设备制造商：
- 对订单中的"关注序列"进行筛查
- 验证客户合法性后才能发货
- 记录合成订单和序列数据，以支持生物安全调查，实现溯源追踪（即使单个序列单独看并不构成威胁）
3. 为什么现在？AI加速生物安全风险
- 合成DNA在线订购能力极大促进了疫苗开发、基础研究和小团队创新
- 但自20多年前病毒重建协议发表以来，这已被认为是生物技术供应链中"坏行为者可造成不成比例伤害"的脆弱节点
- 新变量是AI的飞速进步：AI系统现在在高度技术性的实验室程序问题上已超越博士级病毒学家
- 虽然当前生物安全威胁的证据尚属混合，但趋势明确——AI可能显著削弱历史上阻止坏行为者获取生物武器的知识壁垒
4. 筛查是最成熟、最温和的生物安全措施
- 强调支持筛查不依赖于任何特定的AI观点——生物安全案例已被科学家和政府认识数十年
- 筛查是"最被充分理解、破坏性最小的生物安全措施"之一
- 行业最大的、最负责任的提供商已在自愿筛查和记录，但自愿机制不够
5. 紧迫性与立法呼吁
- "鉴于底层技术变化的速度，我们认为需求紧迫"
- 呼吁国会本届会期就采取行动
- 支持各州也基于现有联邦和行业指南实施要求，但强调需要统一的全国标准，而非"相互冲突的法律拼凑"
6. 共识时刻
- "这是利益相关方之间罕见的共识时刻，他们通常意见相左"
- 希望政策制定者以果断行动回应
AI行业最激烈的竞争对手们一致认为，在AI可能大幅降低生物武器开发门槛之前，必须通过强制性筛查机制堵住这一供应链漏洞——而且必须现在就做。
After fighting publicly for months, Sam Altman and Dario Amodei join hands to send letter to US Congress saying: Make it mandatory to screen
Sam Altman and Dario Amodei have been engaged in a public conflict for years now. From disagreement over AI technology at OpenAI to Anthropic CEO openly criticizing the ChatGPT-maker’s contract with the US Department of Defense, the friction has become one of the most closely watched rivalries in the AI industry. In a latest, the two have come together along with other tech CEOs and leaders urging members of Congress to adopt new laws that would make it harder for bad actors to develop biological weapons using their technology. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei, Google AI CEO Demis Hassabis and Microsoft AI’s Mustafa Suleyman among others have written an open letter to the Congress “In Support of Mandatory Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening and Recordkeeping”.“AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode”."Support for screening does not depend on any particular view of AI; the biosecurity case has been recognized by scientists and governments for decades. Screening is also one of the best understood and least disruptive biosecurity measures available," the letter states.
Here’s the public letter signed by Sam Altman, Dario Amodei and others
In Support of Mandatory Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening and RecordkeepingAs life sciences researchers, builders of AI and biotechnology, and experts with a wide range of views on how to approach AI policy, we call on legislators to make screening of orders for synthetic nucleic acids — and the equipment needed to make them — mandatory.The ability to order synthetic DNA online has accelerated vaccine development, powered basic research, and made it possible for small teams to access capabilities that used to be confined to major institutions. Since the publication of protocols to reconstruct viruses from strands of DNA more than two decades ago, it has also been recognized as a point in the biotechnology supply chain where a bad actor could cause outsized harm. Recognizing the vulnerability, synthesis companies formed the International Gene Synthesis Consortium in 2009 to develop and implement voluntary safeguards against misuse.While the issue is not new, the pace of progress in artificial intelligence is. AI systems now outperform PhD-level virologists on questions about highly technical laboratory procedures in their own domains of expertise. The evidence about what this means for present-day biosecurity threats is genuinely mixed, but the trend is hard to dispute. AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode.Support for screening does not depend on any particular view of AI; the biosecurity case has been recognized by scientists and governments for decades. Screening is also one of the best understood and least disruptive biosecurity measures available. It asks providers of synthesized DNA and manufacturers of synthesis machines to check synthesis requests for sequences of concern and to verify customer legitimacy before shipping orders. Providers should also record synthesis orders and sequence data to support legitimate biosecurity investigations, so that any threat that might evade initial screening can be traced back to its source — including when individual sequences would not raise concern in isolation. Awareness of traceability itself deters misuse.Many of the largest and most responsible providers in the industry already screen and record orders voluntarily because it is well understood that they have an important role to play in maintaining public trust in and mitigating potential misuse of this important technology.Given the pace at which the underlying technology is changing, we believe the need is urgent. Congress should act this session, and we applaud the legislative efforts currently underway. To ensure a consistent national standard rather than a patchwork of conflicting laws, states should also consider implementing requirements based on existing federal and industry guidelines.This is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds. We hope policymakers will meet it with decisive action.
