律师使用AI工具的职业伦理边界 美国新发布的真实判决带来的警示

We deny the extraordinary writ petition seeking review in this dissolution of marriage case and write solely to address counsel's filing of what appears to be “AI slop.”¹Counsel's lengthy and unfocused filings contain gibberish and abuse the litigation process in different ways—including by churning out convoluted, false, and frivolous arguments.

In advance of the hearing, the court appointed counsel to represent the GAL, an act expressly permitted by the appointment order. That night, petitioner's counsel filed an “emergency” motion to vacate the order and again sought to discharge the GAL and vacate the appointment order. The 11-page emergency motion demanded nine forms of relief.

The trial court denied emergency treatment and set the motion for hearing on the afternoon of July 14, 2026 — after the contempt hearing.

On July 13, 2026, petitioner's counsel filed three separate motions in limine seeking to exclude the GAL from testifying and to exclude evidence from the hearing the next day.

The GAL's status hearing began at 1:30 p.m. The GAL's counsel opened by explaining that petitioner had prevented all contact with the child, which prevented the GAL from preparing a report.

In her opening statement, petitioner's counsel raised her pending Omnibus Application and the emergency motion that was set for that afternoon. Counsel objected to the GAL testifying and asked for permission to argue her motion, “[S]ince we're here, I may as well put it before Your Honor. Unless you'd like me to wait.” The court agreed, and counsel argued the motion at length. The court then heard from respondent and the GAL before allowing petitioner to make a final argument. The court denied the motion and ruled that counsel had consented to the emergency motion being heard first. The court adjourned.

Petitioner alleges that, before the contempt hearing at 3:30 p.m., petitioner's counsel began drafting a motion to disqualify and tried to proffer it at the start of the contempt hearing. The judge stated she “did not take proffers” and would not allow further argument.

Contrary to the allegations, however, counsel did not move to disqualify or request the opportunity to do so at any point during the hearing.

Petitioner's counsel did not cross-examine the GAL and relied on her “prior filings”—presumably, the Omnibus Application and/or the three motions in limine filed the day before. The court advised that only the contempt motion was scheduled for hearing.

Petitioner testified and admitted violating the agreed order, and the court sustained hearsay objections when petitioner tried to testify about notes she had obtained from the child's doctors trying to justify the suspension of reunification therapy and visitation.

After respondent rested, petitioner presented nothing and again tried to rely on “prior filings,” but the court maintained its ruling that prior filings were not set for hearing.

After hearing the testimony establishing petitioner's violations, the court held petitioner in contempt and granted makeup timesharing to be determined at a future hearing. The court also awarded respondent attorney's fees and costs as a compensatory sanction but has not determined the amount. As an additional sanction, and to discourage petitioner from continuing to interfere, the court made petitioner responsible for 50% of the GAL fees going forward—pending reallocation during equitable distribution.

Three days after the hearing, petitioner filed a 33-page motion to disqualify the judge. The motion complains about the court's rulings and raises many frivolous arguments, including arguments that are contrary to the record. The court denied the motion as legally insufficient.

This petition followed on July 31, 2026.

The 61-page emergency petition seeks a writ of prohibition to review the denial of the motion to disqualify, but the petition also purports to seek certiorari review of seven other rulings.

The petition demands an emergency stay of all proceedings below, including stopping the trial court from memorializing its rulings in writing.

Strangely, however, the petition then recognizes that the court did so. The petition discusses in granular detail how respondent's proposed order was initially rejected by the case management system and that the court signed the contempt order the next day at 1:54 p.m. and served it at 7:02 p.m. The author thus laments, “The relief this Petition sought to forestall has issued, and the accrual it sets in motion is continuing.”

The first red flag is the emergency request. “Pursuant to our Administrative Order 2014-1, an emergency is a matter of extreme urgency that requires immediate action by this Court in order to avoid imminent, irreparable, and material harm.” Eclectic Synergy, LLC v. Seredin, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1061, 2026 WL 1475836, at *1 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA May 27, 2026) (quoting In Re: Requests for Emergency Treatment, 4th DCA Admin. Order 2014-1 (June 12, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The request must “succinctly” state the “nature of the emergency.”

Petitioner's confusing request complains about rulings, including that the court declined to treat petitioner's filings as an “emergency” but did so at the hearing.

The description continues on like this and repeats a frivolous argument raised throughout these proceedings—that the court could not hear from the GAL because she had not filed a report.

Like the other filings in this case, the emergency request churns out a string of convoluted arguments.

No imminent irreparable harm of any kind is shown. The document alleges an emergency exists because the July 29, 2026, contempt order required the parties to reestablish a timesharing schedule by July 17, 2026, and stated that a rule to show cause should issue on noncompliance. The court, however, has not threatened incarceration as a sanction. Another purported harm was that the GAL's fees are accruing.

No “emergency” by any definition exists. Counsel merely sought priority over other litigants, which is an abuse of procedure. Emergency filings disrupt proceedings by causing this Court to drop everything and should not be filed for tactical reasons.

A true emergency requiring “immediate” action by this Court means action is needed within a matter of hours, not an event that is days or weeks away. Filing an emergency request merely because counsel desires to have a matter expedited is an abuse of procedure.

Eclectic Synergy, LLC, 2026 WL 1475836, at *1 n.1; USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Pines MRI, Inc., 24 So. 3d 588, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Pleadings filed as emergencies disrupt court procedures and interrupt work on cases that were already pending.”).

Another red flag is the petition's request for review of eight separate rulings in this single writ proceeding. See Int'l House of Pancakes (IHOP) v. Robinson, 124 So. 3d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“[I]t was improper for petitioner to seek review of two distinct and separate non-final orders in this single certiorari petition.”).

A prohibition petition seeking review of the denial of a motion to disqualify cannot be used to simultaneously challenge the court's rulings. As discussed further below, the requests for certiorari relief are frivolous.

Another red flag is the citation to our unpublished order deciding a wholly unrelated case three years ago.

Our unpublished decision in that case has no precedential value and should not have been cited. See Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 5th Dist., 434 So. 2d 310, 313 (Fla. 1983) (explaining that an unwritten decision—a per curiam affirmance—“is not a precedent for a principle of law and should not be relied upon for anything other than res judicata”).

Our decision in the prior case is irrelevant to anything in this proceeding. Petitioner cites it solely to disparage the judge. Indeed, at paragraph 109, the author of the motion to disqualify acknowledges:

Like all of counsel's filings, the 33-page motion is extremely difficult to follow and argues 14 grounds for disqualification.

The motion begins with the frivolous argument—often seen in AI hallucinations—that the filing of a motion to disqualify under rule 2.330 automatically stays all proceedings in the trial court. Avery, 2026 WL 1475262, at *1 n.1 (noting that this Court has seen this AI-hallucinated argument all too often).

The author of the petition in this case is similarly mistaken and, at page 30, argues that, after the motion was filed, petitioner “was foreclosed by Rule 2.330 from submitting anything.”

The motion falsely alleges that the judge “systematically muzzled” counsel at the hearing. The hearing transcript refutes this allegation.

“[A] motion made on a trial judge's statement in open court that does not accurately represent what has actually been said cannot comply with the requirement that an affidavit be made ‘in good faith.’” Gregory v. State, 118 So. 3d 770, 780 (Fla. 2013) (concluding that the motion to disqualify was legally insufficient).

Many more of the allegations in this case are contrary to the record. As in Gregory, we conclude that these allegations are insufficient to merit disqualification. Id.Allegations concerning events at a hearing that are contrary to the record are not sufficient to disqualify. Id.at 779-80.

A judge cannot be disqualified based on AI-hallucinated events.