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外刊2024年6月大学英语四级真题长篇阅读精读:Why do Americans work so much? 为何美国人工作那么多 ?

外刊2024年6月大学英语四级真题长篇阅读精读:Why do Americans work so much? 为何美国人工作那么多 ?

CET-4 · 2024 年 6 月 · 长篇阅读

美国人为什么工作这么久?

Why do Americans work so much? 美国人为何

题源:The Atlantic | 2016-01-06 | Rebecca Rosen
篇幅:A–K 共 11 段 | 约 1100 词 | 答案 36–40 EHBFD 41–45 AICJG

01 原文与译文(划线=重难点词)

AHow will we all keep busy when we only have to work 15 hours a week? That was the question that worried the British economist John Maynard Keynes when he wrote his short essay "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren" in 1930. Over the next century, he predicted, the economy would become so productive that people would barely need to work at all. For a while, it looked like Keynes was right. In 1930 the average working week was 47 hours in the United States. But by 1970, the number of hours Americans worked on average had fallen to slightly less than 39.

如果我们每周只需工作 15 小时,大家要怎么打发时间?这是英国经济学家凯恩斯 1930 年写《我们孙辈的经济可能性》时担心的问题。他预言,此后一个世纪,经济会高效到人们几乎不必工作。有一段时间,凯恩斯似乎是对的:1930 年美国平均周工时为 47 小时,而到 1970 年,美国人的平均工时已降至略低于 39 小时。

BBut then something changed. Instead of continuing to decline, the duration of the working week remained stable. It has stayed at just below 40 hours for nearly five decades. So what happened? Why are people working just as much today as in 1970?

但随后情况变了。周工时没有继续下降,而是保持稳定:近五十年来一直停在略低于 40 小时。那么发生了什么?为什么人们今天的工作量和 1970 年一样多?

CThere would be no mystery in this if Keynes had been wrong about the power of technology to increase the economy's productivity, which he thought would lead to a standard of living "between four and eight times as high as it is today." But Keynes got that right: technology has made the economy massively more productive. According to Benjamin M. Friedman, an economist at Harvard, the U.S. economy is right on track to reach Keynes's eight-fold (八倍) multiple by 2029. That is a century after the last data Keynes would have had access to.

如果凯恩斯高估了技术提升生产力的能力,这件事就不难理解——他曾认为技术会让生活水平达到“今天的四到八倍”。但凯恩斯这一点说对了:技术让经济的生产力大幅提高。哈佛经济学家 Benjamin M. Friedman 指出,美国经济正好走在到 2029 年实现凯恩斯“八倍”的轨道上——那距凯恩斯能拿到的最后数据已有一百年。

DIn a new paper, Friedman tries to figure out why that increased productivity has not translated into increased leisure time. Perhaps people just never feel materially satisfied, always wanting more money to buy the next new thing. This is a theory that appeals to many economists. "This argument is, at best, far from sufficient," he writes. If that were the case, why did the duration of the working week decline in the first place?

在一篇新论文中,Friedman 试图弄清,为何生产力提高没有转化为更多闲暇。也许人们从不觉得在物质上满足,总想要更多钱去买下一件新东西。这是许多经济学家认同的理论。“这个论点充其量远远不够,”他写道。若果真如此,周工时当初又为何会下降?

EAnother theory Friedman considers is that, in an era of ever fewer settings that provide effective opportunities for personal connections and relationships, people may place more value on the socialising that happens at work. There is support for this theory. Many people today consider colleagues as friends. But Friedman argues that the evidence for this theory is far from conclusive. Many workers report that they would like to spend more time with family, rather than at work. Furthermore, this theory cannot explain the change in trend in the U.S. working week in the 1970s.

Friedman 考虑的另一理论是:在一个能提供有效人际连接与关系的机会越来越少的时代,人们可能更看重工作中发生的社交。这一理论有支持:今天许多人把同事当朋友。但 Friedman 认为证据远不确凿:许多工作者表示更愿意多陪家人,而不是待在单位;此外,该理论无法解释 1970 年代美国周工时的趋势变化。

FA third possibility proves more convincing for Friedman. That is: American inequality means that the gains of increasing productivity are not widely shared by everyone. In other words, most Americans are too poor to work less. Unlike the other two explanations Friedman considers, this one fits chronologically (按年代). Inequality declined in America during the period following World War II, along with the duration of the working week. But since the early 1970s it has risen dramatically.

第三种可能性对 Friedman 更有说服力:美国的不平等意味着生产力提高的收益未被广泛共享。换言之,多数美国人太穷,无法少工作。与前两种解释不同,这一解释在时间上吻合:二战后一段时期,美国的不平等程度与周工时一同下降;但自 1970 年代初以来,不平等急剧上升。

GKeynes's prediction of a shorter working week rests on the idea that the standard of living would continue rising for everyone. But Friedman says that this is not what has happened. Although Keynes's eight-fold figure holds up for the economy as a whole, it is not at all the case for the median American worker. For them, output by 2029 is likely to be around 3.5 times what it was when Keynes was writing. This is a bit below his four-to eight-fold predicted range.

凯恩斯关于周工时缩短的预测,建立在一个观念之上:所有人的生活水平都会持续上升。但 Friedman 说,事实并非如此。虽然“八倍”对整体经济成立,对美国中位劳动者却完全不成立:对他们而言,到 2029 年的产出可能约为凯恩斯写作时的 3.5 倍,略低于他预测的 4 到 8 倍区间。

HThis can be seen in the median worker's income over this time period, complete with a shift in 1973 that fits in precisely with when the working week stopped shrinking. According to Friedman, between 1947 and 1973 the average hourly wage for normal workers (those who were not in management roles) in private industries other than agriculture nearly doubled in terms of what their money could buy. But by 2013 the average hourly wage for ordinary workers had fallen 5 percent from the 1973 level in terms of actual purchasing power. Thus, though American incomes may have gone up since 1973, the amount that American workers can actually buy with their money has gone down. For most Americans, then, the magic of increasing productivity stopped working around 1973. Thus, they had to keep working just as much in order to maintain their standard of living.

这一点可以从这一时期中位劳动者的收入看出来,其中 1973 年的转折恰好与周工时停止缩短的时间吻合。据 Friedman,1947 至 1973 年间,私营非农行业中普通工人(非管理岗)的平均时薪按其购买力计算几乎翻了一番;但到 2013 年,普通工人的平均时薪按实际购买力已比 1973 年水平下降 5%。因此,尽管美国人的收入自 1973 年以来可能上升,他们实际能用钱买到的东西却减少了。对多数美国人来说,生产力增长的魔力在 1973 年前后失效了;于是为了维持生活水平,他们只能继续工作同样多。

IWhat Keynes predicted was a very optimistic version of what economists call technological unemployment. This is the idea that less labor will be necessary because machines can do so much. In Keynes's vision, the resulting unemployment would be distributed more or less evenly across society in the form of increased leisure. But Friedman says that, for Americans, reality is much darker. Americans now have a labor market in which millions of people—those with fewer skills and less education—are seeking whatever poorly paid work they can get. This is confirmed by a recent poll that found that, for half of hourly workers, their top concern is not that they work too much but that they work too little. This is most likely not because they like their jobs so much. Rather, we can assume it is because they need the money.

凯恩斯预测的是经济学家所谓“技术性失业”的一种非常乐观的版本:机器能做很多,所需劳动会更少。在他的设想中,由此产生的失业会以增加闲暇的形式,大致均匀地分布到全社会。但 Friedman 说,对美国而言现实要暗淡得多:美国的劳动力市场上有数百万人——技能较少、教育程度较低者——在寻找任何能得到的低薪工作。最近一项民调印证了这一点:对一半的时薪工人来说,他们最担心的不是工作太多,而是工作太少。这多半不是因为他们多爱自己的工作,而更可能是因为他们需要钱。

JThis explanation leaves an important question. If the very rich—the workers who have reaped above-average gains from the increased productivity since Keynes's time—can afford to work less, why do they continue to work so much? (Indeed, research has shown that the highest earners in America tend to work the most.) Friedman believes that for many top earners, work is a labor of love. They are doing work they care about and are interested in, and doing more of it is not necessarily a burden. For them, it may even be a pleasure. These top earners derive meaning from their jobs and work is an important part of how they think of themselves. And, of course, they are compensated for it at a level that makes it worth their while.

这一解释留下一个重要问题:如果非常富有的人——那些自凯恩斯时代以来从生产力提高中获得高于平均收益的人——负担得起少工作,为什么他们仍工作那么多?(研究确实表明,美国收入最高者往往工作最多。)Friedman 认为,对许多高收入者来说,工作是“出于热爱的劳动”:他们做的是自己在乎、感兴趣的事,多做并不一定是负担,甚至可能是乐趣。这些人从工作中获得意义,工作是他们自我认知的重要部分;当然,报酬之高也让这一切值得。

KFriedman concludes that the prosperity Keynes predicted is here. After all, the economy as a whole has grown even more brilliantly than he expected. But for most Americans, that prosperity is nowhere to be seen. And, as a result, neither are those shorter working weeks.

Friedman 的结论是:凯恩斯预言的繁荣已经到来。毕竟,整体经济的增长甚至比他预期的更出色。但对多数美国人来说,那种繁荣无处可见;其结果就是,那些更短的周工时也无处可见。

02 划线词逐段对照

Aproductiveadj. 高产的;生产力高的

Abarelyadv. 几乎不

Bdurationn. 持续时间

Bremain stable保持稳定

Cmultiplen. 倍数

Dtranslate into转化为;变成

Dmateriallyadv. 在物质上

Dappeal to对……有吸引力

Dfar from sufficient远远不够

Eeran. 时代

Econclusiveadj. 确凿的;决定性的

Efurthermoreadv. 此外;而且

Finequalityn. 不平等

Fgainn. 收益;增长

Fchronologicallyadv. 按时间顺序地

Fdramaticallyadv. 急剧地;显著地

Grest on建立在……之上

Ghold up(观点、结论)站得住脚

Gmedianadj. 中位数的

Hpurchasing power购买力

Itechnological unemployment技术性失业

Idistributev. 分配;分布

Ievenlyadv. 均匀地

Ilabor market劳动力市场

Ipolln. 民意调查

Iassumev. 假定;认为

Jreapv. 获得(收益)

Jlabor of love出于热爱而做的工作

Jburdenn. 负担

Jderive … from从……中获得

Jcompensatev. 补偿;付酬

Kprosperityn. 繁荣

Knowhere to be seen无处可见

03 text analysis 

   经济评论式特稿(explanatory feature)。以凯恩斯 1930 年的旧预言开篇,用 Friedman 新论文中的三种解释推进,最后落到“繁荣无处可见”的判断,属议论文。A 提出悖论(预言 vs 数据)→ B 现象(周工时五十年不变)→ C 先排除“技术没进步”→ D–F 三种解释(物质欲望、职场社交、不平等),前两种被否 → G–H 用中位劳动者购买力作证 → I–J 追问两端(穷人没活干、富人干太多)→ K 结论。  财经与公共政策语域,术语密集但常见(productivity、inequality、purchasing power、labor market、technological unemployment);长句多带让步与插入成分。

     难点 ① 三个理论并行,题干只描述其中之一,最容易张冠李戴;② 年份与数字密集(1930、1970、1973、2029、47、39、3.5 倍、5%),这是定位的第一锚点。

04 四级高频词与短语

keep busy忙于;打发时间

economistn. 经济学家

predictv. 预测

on average平均而言

declinev./n. 下降;减少

slightlyadv. 略微

for decades数十年来

mysteryn. 谜;难以理解的事

standard of living生活水平

be on track to有望;正沿着……轨道

figure out弄清;想明白

at best充其量

settingn. 环境;场合

place value on重视

evidencen. 证据

trendn. 趋势

convincingadj. 有说服力的

in other words换言之

fitv. 吻合;契合

shiftn. 转变;转折

preciselyadv. 恰好;精确地

wagen. 工资

doublev. 翻倍

maintainv. 维持

optimisticadj. 乐观的

visionn. 设想;愿景

confirmv. 证实

top concern最关心的问题

earnern. 挣钱者;收入者

afford to负担得起

derive meaning from从……中获得意义

as a result结果;因此

nowhereadv. 无处

05 find answers

① 圈锚点:年份(1930、1970、1973、2029)、数字(47、39、40 小时、3.5 倍、5%)、人名(Keynes、Friedman)。

② 顺着读:段落顺序 ≈ 题干顺序,45 题回到 G 段是唯一回环,靠“standard of living … continue rising”定位。

③ 认替换:has not changed ← has stayed at just below 40 hours;was right ← got that right;keep their living standards ← maintain their standard of living。

④ 防错位:40 题的“许多经济学家认为”只对应 D 段,而 Friedman 本人恰恰否定它——主体不同,答案就不同。

36–45 逐题

36ESome people view socializing at the workplace as a chance to develop personal relationships.

定位:people may place more value on the socialising that happens at work … Many people today consider colleagues as friends

替换:view … as a chance ← place more value on;develop personal relationships ← consider colleagues as friends

37HAs ordinary American workers' average hourly pay had decreased despite increasing productivity, they had to work just as many hours as before to keep their living standards.

定位:the average hourly wage for ordinary workers had fallen 5 percent … they had to keep working just as much in order to maintain their standard of living

替换:decreased ← fallen 5 percent;keep their living standards ← maintain their standard of living

38BAmerican workers' average weekly working time has not changed for nearly half a century.

定位:It has stayed at just below 40 hours for nearly five decades

替换:has not changed ← has stayed at just below 40 hours;nearly half a century ← nearly five decades

39FFriedman believes inequality in the U.S. largely explains why increasing productivity has not resulted in reduced working hours.

定位:A third possibility proves more convincing for Friedman. That is: American inequality means that the gains of increasing productivity are not widely shared

替换:largely explains ← proves more convincing;reduced working hours ← too poor to work less

40DMany economists assume people's thirst for material things has prevented them from enjoying more leisure time.

定位:Perhaps people just never feel materially satisfied … This is a theory that appeals to many economists

替换:thirst for material things ← never feel materially satisfied;has prevented ← 因果改写

41AAn economist's prediction about a shorter average working week seemed to be correct for a time in the 20th century.

定位:For a while, it looked like Keynes was right. … by 1970 … had fallen to slightly less than 39

替换:seemed to be correct for a time ← For a while, it looked like … was right

42IIn the U.S. labor market, the primary concern of people with less schooling and fewer skills is to secure any employment even if it is low-paid.

定位:those with fewer skills and less education—are seeking whatever poorly paid work they can get … their top concern is not that they work too much but that they work too little

替换:less schooling ← less education;secure any employment ← seeking whatever … work they can get;low-paid ← poorly paid

43CKeynes was right in predicting that technology would make the economy much more productive.

定位:But Keynes got that right: technology has made the economy massively more productive.

替换:was right ← got that right;much more productive ← massively more productive

44JMany of the highest earners have a keen interest in and love for what they are doing.

定位:for many top earners, work is a labor of love. They are doing work they care about and are interested in

替换:keen interest in and love ← care about and are interested in / labor of love

45GAccording to Keynes, there would be a shorter working week with everyone's standard of living continuing to rise.

定位:Keynes's prediction of a shorter working week rests on the idea that the standard of living would continue rising for everyone

替换:there would be ← prediction of;continuing to rise ← would continue rising

06 summary

      Keynes once predicted that rising productivity would leave people barely working, and for a while the numbers agreed. Then the duration of the American working week remained stable just below 40 hours — and this passage asks why.

The answer is not technology, which holds up: output has grown on track. Nor is it our materially unsatisfied nature, nor our liking for colleagues; Friedman finds those explanations far from sufficient or conclusive. What fitschronologically is inequality: since the 1970s the gains of productivity have not been shared, the median worker's purchasing power has fallen, and people must keep working just as much to maintain their standard of living.

So even a labor of love at the top coexists with a labor market where the top concern is too little work, not too much. The prosperity Keynes foresaw arrived; it is simply nowhere to be seen for most.

参考译文

凯恩斯曾预言,生产力提高会让人们几乎不必工作,有一段时间数据也确实如此。此后美国周工时却稳定在略低于 40 小时——本文追问其原因。

答案既不是技术(这一点站得住:产出按预期增长),也不是“物质上永不满足的本性”,更不是我们对同事的喜好;Friedman 认为这些解释都远远不够、并不确凿。真正在时间上吻合的是不平等:1970 年代以来,生产力增长的收益未被共享,中位劳动者的购买力下降,人们必须继续工作同样多来维持生活水平。

于是,顶层的“出于热爱的劳动”与一个“最担心工作太少”的劳动力市场并存。凯恩斯预见的繁荣确实到来了,只是对多数人无处可见。

原文版权归 BBC 与作者 Bryan Lufkin 所有;试题版权归全国大学英语四、六级考试委员会。仅供教学使用。

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